By Bassie Sesay
British right-wing politics is growing more fragmented. Under the first-past-the-post system, that fragmentation could make a huge difference during the next general election, but it would be misleading to think that cooperation between Reform UK and Restore Britain would automatically mean a unified faction or a far-right government. The question to ask is a much simpler one: can rival parties competing for the same votes find a way to work around dividing them?
Let’s look at recent examples. During the Holborn and St Pancras by-election held on 8 October, Labour candidate Sagal Abdi-Wali received 12,292 votes, while Green Party’s Zack Polanski secured 8,928. Reform UK scored 1,612, or about 5.9%, while Restore Britain received 692, or about 2.5% of the votes. Turnout was 38.76%. In total, Reform and Restore secured 2,304, or roughly 8.4% of valid votes. However, it does not mean that those voters would automatically switch to whichever party stepped down. Political party members are not assets that can be moved from one party to another; some might choose to vote for the other candidate, stay at home, or vote for a totally different party. That point is crucial because the first-past-the-post system benefits candidates with concentrated support. At the same time, competing parties can divide voters who might otherwise prefer a broadly similar political position. However, summing up their vote shares is purely an arithmetic exercise that could stir up the political spectrum.
Recent Westminster polls also confirm the same trend. The YouGov voting intention poll taken on 4–5 October shows 27% support for Labour, 22% for Reform UK, 20% for the Conservatives, 11% for the Liberal Democrats and the Greens, and 3% for Restore Britain. According to these numbers, Reform and Restore would obtain 25% of the vote. That number is, theoretically speaking, close to Labour’s 27%. Again, however, it does not mean that a Reform–Restore ticket would receive 25% as well. A person voting for Reform today might not want to vote for Restore, and vice versa. Still, that shows why cooperation would benefit both parties. If two parties compete for the same voters in constituencies where neither party is strong enough to win on its own, they can help another party to win. Alternatively, they could coordinate themselves to concentrate their resources and votes on selected constituencies.
Moreover, there are indications that some form of cooperation is underway. Rupert Lowe has always expressed willingness for cooperation between Restore Britain and Reform. Farage, on the other hand, has previously expressed readiness for “talks” about a possible deal between his party and Reform. Nevertheless, the relations between those two parties have always been quite complex and characterised by many disputes. Indeed, Nigel Farage has recently said that Lowe claimed Reform decided to refuse a pact deal. These differences shouldn’t be ignored.
Looking ahead, an electoral pact would be a rather modest collaboration. According to the definition provided by the Electoral Commission, an election pact is an agreement in which a party or a candidate doesn’t stand in a certain region to increase the possibility of winning for the other party. Practically, Reform and Restore could agree that only one of these parties would contest some constituencies. A coalition, however, is an entirely different matter. As defined by the UK Parliament, a coalition government is formed jointly by two political parties. This kind of government is typically accompanied by negotiations regarding the issues of government policy, positions in the government, etc. The coalition of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats formed in 2010 is the most recent example of such cooperation in the UK Parliament.
Therefore, the electoral pact shouldn’t be interpreted as a starting point of a coalition government. It is possible to cooperate in order to gain seats in Parliament without merging into a single organisation. A coalition requires a resolution of more complicated issues like leadership, politics, etc.
While Reform and Restore UK have similar appeals for a part of the electorate, they remain rival political parties with different leaderships and organisational structures. Asking a party to give up its candidates means asking its members and supporters to vote for the other party. Therefore, party leaders need to estimate not only the potential number of seats but also what political identity their parties could lose because of this cooperation. There is a risk in supposing that every voter supporting one party could replace a voter of the other party. To prove it, the polls need to be carried out at constituency level. The simple addition of the national vote shares won’t work here. The same caution applies to claims about a possible far-right government. Current polling cannot establish that Nigel Farage, Rupert Lowe, or any other figure will lead the next government. Nor can a single by-election demonstrate what would happen across hundreds of constituencies.
What the evidence does show is more modest, but still significant: the British right is divided, Reform remains a substantial electoral force, Restore has established a measurable—though considerably smaller—national vote share, and first-past-the-post can make the distribution of votes between competing parties electorally consequential. The latest YouGov figures put their combined national support at 25%, but that should be treated as an indication of potential overlap, not as a ready-made electoral coalition.
The strategic question, then, is not whether Reform and Restore can simply add their votes together. They cannot. It is whether they can persuade enough voters that cooperation is preferable to competition—and whether their leaders can overcome the personal, organisational, and policy differences that have so far kept them apart. If they succeed, cooperation could alter the electoral arithmetic in a first-past-the-post system. If they fail, divided support could continue to benefit their opponents in closely fought constituencies.