By Sana Sareen
The Iran war is entering its eighth month, exposing vulnerabilities in Gulf aviation, shipping and energy infrastructure. An attempted hijacking aboard a flydubai flight revealed the danger from within an airline, while reported strikes on Riyadh’s airport highlighted the threat to infrastructure. US naval reinforcements are moving into the region as talks with Tehran stall. Gulf crude exports have recovered to pre-war levels, excluding Iran, but continued threats to shipping put that recovery at risk.
Aviation faces threats from within and without
A flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv with over 170 people went into an emergency after its co-pilot attacked Captain Smit Machchhar with a crash axe. The aircraft dropped more than 14,000 feet in under 30 seconds before passengers overpowered the attacker and reserve pilots landed safely in Saudi Arabia.
Investigators say the 29-year-old Omani co-pilot planned to hijack and crash the plane into Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport. The UAE attorney general described the incident as a terrorist act. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attributed it to “Islamist radical indoctrination“.
The suspect reportedly passed all hiring and security checks without warning signs. The incident exposes a gap in aviation security: screening can identify some risks before recruitment, but it is less effective at detecting a trusted crew member whose intentions change later. Psychological assessments alone cannot reliably predict future violence. Prosecutors trace his radicalisation to 2017, long before he joined flydubai, raising questions about how airlines identify emerging threats after recruitment.
External threats persist. An attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport killed 12 and wounded over 300. The Houthis have warned airlines against entering Saudi airspace but have not claimed responsibility for the airport attack. Asked whether the US would join Saudi strikes on the Houthis, President Trump said, “We may”.
Crew screening cannot stop a missile, just as air defences cannot detect a pilot’s intention to hijack an aircraft. Prolonged airspace restrictions could disrupt aid deliveries, diplomatic travel and family connections across the region.
A larger US presence, more room for error
The United States is moving roughly 9,000 sailors and Marines to the Middle East. Reports suggest three American aircraft carriers could arrive by late October or November.
The deployment comes as diplomacy stalls. Iran offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days in exchange for lifting the US naval blockade, waiving oil sanctions and agreeing to a ceasefire covering Lebanon. Trump rejected the offer.
Trump said nobody knows who is running Iran after senior leaders had been killed. Iran’s foreign ministry rejected that claim. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded his father, has not appeared publicly, leaving uncertainty about who can authorise an agreement.
The timing creates a strategic dilemma. If carriers arrive as Trump’s pre-election pause expires, Tehran could interpret the deployment as preparation for renewed strikes rather than pressure to negotiate. That perception could complicate diplomacy even if Washington intends the deployment as deterrence. Fuel prices are also a risk for Trump’s party before the midterms, potentially strengthening the political case for avoiding a new attack before 3 November. The extent of that influence remains uncertain.
A US decision to join strikes on the Houthis would open a second front beyond Iran. Trump’s pledge covers Iran, not its allies, so striking the Houthis would raise pressure on Tehran without breaking it. Whether he sees it that way is unknown.
More warships may deter attacks on US forces and commercial shipping. They also shorten the fuse. More hulls in tight waters mean more chances for a collision, a misread radar track or a drone shot down by mistake. With so little trust, leaders may retaliate before they know who did what.
Oil flows adapt, but vulnerabilities remain
Gulf crude and condensate exports reached at least 16.5 million barrels per day between 1 and 28 September, matching the pre-war average, excluding Iran. The figure excludes Iran, whose exports face a US blockade.
Alternative routes reduce reliance on Hormuz but do not eliminate risk. Houthi warnings against Saudi energy infrastructure and continued risks to Red Sea shipping leave the oil export workaround vulnerable to disruption.
The Houthis’ campaign against Saudi Arabia links this article’s two stories: it threatens Saudi airports, Saudi energy plants and the Red Sea route that carries Saudi oil around Hormuz. Saudi Arabia is both a prime Houthi target and the heart of the oil workaround, so pressure on its airports and pressure on its oil are one problem, not two.
Oil-importing economies, by contrast, remain exposed to increased energy costs and shipping charges even when physical supply is maintained. For lower-income households, higher fuel costs can raise transport and food prices. For humanitarian agencies, they can increase the cost of moving people, supplies and equipment.
Resilience without resolution
Gulf aviation and oil exports continue operating, but neither is insulated from further attacks. The flydubai incident exposed the difficulty of anticipating insider threats, while the reported airport strikes highlighted the danger to infrastructure. US military deployment shows how stalled diplomacy can coincide with rising escalation risks, even as alternative pipelines and tanker routes preserve oil supplies.
These workarounds buy time rather than security. Regional governments must keep essential transport and energy systems functioning while pursuing a political settlement that addresses the conflict driving these risks.