By Sarina Tareen
International law is intended to limit the exercise of State authority. However, when it conflicts with the strategic interests of powerful countries, legal obligations can be hard to turn into action. The war on Gaza reveals a widening rift between what international law requires and what powerful countries can and will do. The Health Cluster reported to the Ministry of Health that 73,386 Palestinians were killed and 174,256 others injured in the Gaza Strip between 7 October 2023 and 9 August 2026. This includes 1,258 fatalities and 4,295 injuries between the announcement of a ceasefire agreement on 10 October 2025 and 9 August 2026. Since 2023, Israel has killed more than 800 Palestinian teachers and injured over 3,300. UNRWA has documented 393 staff members who have been killed in Gaza since the war began.
The Gaza Conflict and the Limits of International Law
Since the start of the most recent conflict on 7 October 2023, the Council has considered fourteen resolutions, with only four passing. The United States has exercised its veto power six times, including five times as the sole opposing country. That made Israel the 49th vetoed UN resolution relating to the Jewish state since the UN was established. The most powerful body in the international system, the one responsible for peace and security, has been left practically powerless on the most urgent humanitarian crisis of our times. UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the veto is a tool that has “crippled” the Council’s ability to act on Gaza. In addition, the deepening geopolitical divisions have made the veto an effective means of paralysing the Security Council’s action, he stated in February.
The Security Council and the Politics of Veto
Realists argue that international law is more effective when it aligns with the interests of powerful states. In this sense, states are more willing to accept international law when it aligns with domestic political, economic and strategic goals, but reject it when it does not. Among the most prominent realist scholars, Hans Morgenthau held that international law is without a central agency with the power to enforce it in a regular fashion. In January 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued provisional measures requiring Israel to take steps to prevent acts falling under the Genocide Convention and to allow humanitarian assistance into Gaza. However, the Court lacks an independent enforcement mechanism, while implementation depends on state cooperation. The decision of the Security Council is shaped by the veto power of its five permanent members.
On 21 November 2024, ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. The warrants are for offences allegedly committed between 8 October 2023 and 20 May 2024. But these decisions have been constrained by political and practical limits. Israel has rejected the ICC’s jurisdiction and challenged the Court’s authority over the case. The United States has never ratified the Rome Statute and has also voiced objections to the ICC’s jurisdiction over Israel. The main premise is that international law can generate legal and diplomatic pressure, but the implementation of international law requires the cooperation of the state.
The UN Security Council Resolution 2803 and the Gaza Governance Framework
In November 2025, a UN Security Council resolution, No. 2803, was introduced as a diplomatic solution to the Gaza conflict. The resolution was adopted by 13 votes, with Russia and China abstaining.
The resolution calls for a Board of Peace, led by President Donald Trump, to serve as an administrative body that would essentially rule the Gaza Strip. In reality, this would give Trump and other yet-to-be-nominated leaders the power to implement ceasefires, distribute aid and rebuild Gaza with absolute authority. The Board of Peace is technically called temporary, but there is no definite timeframe. Its mandate is due for renewal on 31 December 2027, suggesting that the US-led arrangement in Gaza could continue for more than a year.
The proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF) raises a related question. Resolution 2803 authorises the force to operate under a unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace, in close consultation and cooperation with Israel and Egypt. The resolution also links the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The ISF would not be a UN peacekeeping force, but the United States would be its leader, and it would operate “in close consultation and cooperation” with Israel and Egypt. Instead, it would be a foreign invasion force explicitly tasked with confronting and disarming Palestinian resistance groups. The resolution states that the ISF “will protect civilians”, a claim that rings hollow given that the primary threat to civilians in Gaza has been the Israeli army. The ISF will contribute to security, demilitarisation and civilian protection in Gaza. As agreed security milestones are met, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are expected to withdraw, although an Israeli security perimeter will remain until Gaza is deemed secure against renewed threats. The draft resolution was vetoed by both Russia and China for its inherent bias against the Palestinian people. Moscow even submitted an alternative proposal, leading to speculation about a possible veto.
In the end, they chose to abstain and let the US set the agenda for the Security Council, with yet another example of Washington projecting its influence on the international stage. The Russian ambassador to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, warned during the session that the ISF could become an active party in the conflict. China’s permanent representative, Fu Cong, had said that the US had pushed the Council to “make a crucial decision on the future and fate of Gaza” and that several member states’ concerns had been overlooked.
On 16 September 2025, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry found that Israel had been and continues to commit genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The Commission found that four acts in the Genocide Convention had been committed: killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, and imposing measures intended to prevent births. Humanitarian conditions were also marked by famine. The IPC Famine Review Committee, supported by the UN, declared famine in the Gaza Governorate on 22 August 2025. UN Secretary-General António Guterres characterised famine as “a man-made disaster” and asserted that it was a “failure of systems that sustain human life”.
However, these legal developments have not produced a consistent enforcement mechanism capable of compelling states to change their conduct. There was also some tension in the UN Security Council resolution adopted on 17 November 2025, which approved an American initiative for Gaza, comprising a Board of Peace for temporary administration and reconstruction. The deal has raised doubts about who holds authority over Gaza and whose political agenda is being followed in the implementation of international decisions.