Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy is a hedge: broaden security partnerships, keep diplomatic channels open with Tehran, and protect its economic transformation under prolonged instability. The war has exposed the kingdom’s vulnerability to attacks on its territory, energy infrastructure, and maritime routes. Riyadh is not abandoning its relationship with Washington. It is still appealing to the United States for more military help while adding partners.

The emerging strategy brings Saudi Arabia closer to Türkiye and Pakistan through the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. Its value depends on whether political solidarity becomes credible defence without drawing the kingdom into a wider war.

The limits of the American umbrella

For decades, the United States has been central to Saudi security, but the conflict has exposed the limits of relying heavily on one external partner. Saudi authorities confirmed that at least 12 people were killed and more than 300 wounded in the 10 October attack on Riyadh’s airport. The picture is less clear for 27 October, when the Houthis said they fired ballistic missiles at the Ras Tanura refinery and the defence ministry in Riyadh. Saudi authorities did not confirm either strike. The Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted two missiles aimed at Riyadh and three aimed at the Eastern Province, and Saudi Civil Defence said shrapnel from the interceptions damaged property in the capital. A maritime security agency reported a fire near Ras Tanura; Saudi authorities said it was contained, while the Houthi claim of a direct refinery strike remains unconfirmed.

The Mecca pact: promise vs capability

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026, treats an externally originating armed attack on one signatory as an attack against all. It commits the parties to use all necessary means to eliminate threats to one another’s territorial integrity, sovereignty or internationally recognised borders. Support still requires consultation, agreement and action under national law, so it is not automatic.

After renewed Houthi attacks, the three countries activated collective deterrence measures under the pact for the first time. They agreed to provide military forces and capabilities and ensure their rapid deployment to Saudi Arabia, subject to national laws. Whether they have produced operational deployments remains unclear.

Ratification is unfinished: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have completed theirs. On 27 October, a Turkish parliamentary committee approved the ratification bill, which still needs a final parliamentary vote.

In terms of capability, the pact brings real assets but not yet a combined defence. Pakistan’s reported package includes fighter jets, drones and an HQ-9 air-defence system, alongside Saudi Patriot and THAAD batteries. Türkiye can add air defence, electronic warfare and technical teams. But the three militaries use different systems, and no public evidence shows a common air picture.

On command, the structure is political, not military. The pact’s committee can convene quickly in a crisis, but nothing published says who decides that an attack requires a response, or through which chain of command.

On political will, Riyadh wants protection and more pressure on its attackers. Pakistan wants to avoid another Yemen war or a clash with Iran. Türkiye seeks a larger regional role but faces legal limits on deploying troops abroad. Both have described their role as support, including reconnaissance, while Saudi forces conduct combat operations.

Türkiye: defensive depth, not a replacement

Türkiye’s contribution is technical and industrial: air defence, drone technology, electronic warfare, equipment, technicians, and emergency response support. But Ankara’s limits are legal and political. Türkiye’s constitution requires parliamentary approval for troop deployments; the pact awaits final ratification. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan ruled out offensive operations. Ankara has kept air defence and electronic warfare equipment in the kingdom since last year.

Pakistan: defender and mediator

Pakistan is the only partner with forces already in Saudi Arabia: a reported 8,000 troops, a squadron of fighter jets and an air-defence system. Yet it is also positioning itself as a mediator between Iran and the United States. Its limits are domestic and financial: an army stretched by militancy, regional tensions, and an economy constrained by reliance on the IMF. Tehran also holds leverage through border friction, Gwadar, and its ties with Kabul. Islamabad will defend Saudi territory, but fighting in Yemen could require fresh political authorisation. Pakistan is unlikely to confront Iran directly.

That tension was visible on 26 October, when Saudi, Pakistani, and Turkish officials met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran. The four sides agreed to continue dialogue; Saudi Arabia said the meeting aimed to prevent a return to escalation.

Diplomacy as a security instrument

Engagement with Iran does not mean Saudi Arabia’s security concerns have disappeared. Tehran’s role is substantial but not absolute. Iranian support has helped the Houthis conduct more potent attacks, including through targeting intelligence. A senior Saudi diplomat says Iran continues to arm, train, and support the group. Influence is not control. Iran can shape the escalation without ordering the Houthis to abandon gains around Mocha or Bab al-Mandeb. Tehran appears to treat Houthi restraint as part of broader bargaining with Washington, while the Houthis’ own conditions, including an end to Saudi Arabia’s air blockade, remain outside its gift. Even after the 26 October Tehran meeting, continued Houthi attacks show that diplomacy has not yet reduced the threat.

The Strait of Hormuz remains central to this vulnerability. Since Hormuz was severely disrupted, Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline has provided an alternative route to Yanbu on the Red Sea. No alternative infrastructure can eliminate risks to energy exports and maritime commerce. The pipeline was temporarily shut in September after a drone attack that Saudi officials said originated in Iraq. Threats around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb connect Saudi security directly to Yemen.

The cost of hedging

Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation gives Riyadh a powerful reason to contain the war. Vision 2030 depends on investor confidence, reliable trade routes and the perception that the kingdom can protect critical infrastructure. Missile interceptions, pipeline shutdowns and shipping disruption raise insurance, logistics and financing costs; they also make long-term private investment harder to price.

The strategy may improve air defence and diplomatic options. But it will not deliver credible collective defence without shared command arrangements, pre-positioned capabilities and a clear response mechanism.

Saudi Arabia’s hedge is a rational response to a more dangerous region. Its success will be measured by whether it makes Saudi territory, energy exports, and economic transformation harder to disrupt.

Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 was designed to reduce the kingdom’s dependence on oil by attracting foreign capital, expanding the private sector, and building new industries. The regional war is now testing that model from the outside, on top of fiscal pressures that predate it.

The central question is whether Saudi Arabia can sustain its transformation while Houthi missiles and drones are fired at its cities and energy sites, shipping lanes are disrupted, and major projects compete with urgent security needs.

A transformation already under way

Unemployment among Saudis has fallen from 12.3% in 2016 to 7.2%. Private-sector employment among Saudis has risen from 1.7 million in 2020 to 2.6 million, and female labour-force participation has risen from 22.8% to 35%.

The non-oil economy has expanded. The Vision 2030 annual report says non-oil activities now account for more than half of GDP. GASTAT puts real GDP growth at 4.5% in 2025. Oil activities grew by 5.7%, non-oil activities by 4.9%, and government activities by 0.9%.

The war exposes a central vulnerability in the plan: its dependence on investor confidence and secure trade routes.

Foreign investment is the real test

Vision 2030 targets $100 billion in annual foreign direct investment inflows by 2030, or SAR 388 billion a year under the National Investment Strategy. That is more than three times the record gross inflows of SAR 119 billion in 2024.

In the second quarter, gross FDI inflows fell 18% from the first quarter and 16.9% from a year earlier, to SAR 22.3 billion. After SAR 3.2 billion in outflows, net inflows were SAR 19.1 billion.

The second quarter was the first full quarter affected by the regional conflict. The decline reflects weaker investor appetite. The quarterly data cannot separate the war’s effect from pre-existing financial pressures. State and private capital differ. State-backed financing can cushion projects in the short term, but private investors weigh political risk, insurance costs, and the likelihood that a project will generate returns on schedule.

From spectacle to infrastructure

The retreat from Saudi Arabia’s most ambitious projects began before the war. In 2025, the Public Investment Fund ordered deep spending cuts across more than 100 of its companies, after lower oil prices and a cut in Aramco’s dividend squeezed its cash. The Finance Ministry later forecast a 2025 deficit of SAR 245 billion, more than double its initial projection.

The war added a different set of pressures. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was severely disrupted, and ports, logistics networks, and digital infrastructure gained strategic value. NEOM halted further work on The Line until at least after 2030, shifting resources to infrastructure, including ports and data centres.

The sequence matters. Funding strain was visible before the war; the halt of The Line was reported in May, three months after the conflict began. The evidence does not show which pressure decided the outcome. The war looks more like an accelerant to an already-underway reassessment than its cause.

The shift reflects both commercial and security calculations. Megaprojects take years to generate returns, while ports and logistics can support trade now. The Port of NEOM is being tested as an alternative trade route, as disruption at Hormuz raises the value of Red Sea access. This is not necessarily a retreat, but it changes Vision 2030’s public promise: from rapid, visible transformation to a longer, more cautious build-out.

High oil prices, shrinking output

The war has created a fiscal paradox. Higher oil prices may support oil revenues, but disrupted production and shipping limit the benefit. In the second quarter, real GDP fell 4.7% year on year, with oil activities down 24.8% and non-oil activities up 0.9%. The IMF’s October World Economic Outlook projects Saudi Arabia’s economy to contract by 3.3% in 2026, before growing by 7.9% in 2027. The July update had projected 1.7% growth for 2026 and 5.5% for 2027. The IMF links the regional downgrade to a longer closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Its baseline assumes the strait reopens in March 2027, with pre-war conditions returning broadly by October 2027.

The projected 2027 rebound would not, by itself, signal a new phase of growth. Much of it would reflect activity lost during the conflict.

The Red Sea workaround

With Hormuz severely disrupted since late February, Saudi Arabia has relied more heavily on the East-West pipeline, which carries crude across the kingdom to Yanbu on the Red Sea. That puts the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb at the centre of Saudi economic security, and the workaround is vulnerable.

Drones hit the pipeline on 10 September, and Saudi Arabia shut it as a precaution. Saudi Arabia said the drones came from Iraq; no group claimed responsibility. Saudi Arabia restarted the line on 22 September at a low rate, and its energy minister said on 6 October that flows had reached 5.8 million barrels a day.

Other events remain claims. On 27 October, the Houthis said they hit the Ras Tanura refinery. Saudi Arabia has not confirmed a refinery strike. Alternative routes reduce single-point dependence but do not eliminate risk. A war that disrupts Hormuz, threatens Saudi shipping, and puts energy infrastructure at risk creates overlapping pressure on the kingdom’s export capacity.

The cost of prolonged instability

Reprioritised projects and stronger logistics cannot offset the costs of a prolonged conflict. State funding can cushion the shock, but it cannot substitute indefinitely for private investment, reliable export revenues, and secure trade routes. Vision 2030 is not necessarily derailed, but the conditions for its success have changed. The decisive test is whether Riyadh can protect the infrastructure its economy depends on, restore investor confidence, and sustain diversification without letting security costs and financing pressures undermine its ambitions.

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